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The generation and implementation of ideas are crucial for economic performance.
We study this in a model of endogenous growth, where productivity increases with
innovation, and where the exchange of ideas (technology transfer) allows those with
comparative advantage implement them. Search, bargaining, and commitment fric-
tions impede the idea market, however, reducing e¢ ciency and growth. We charac-
terize optimal policies involving subsidies to innovative and entrepreneurial activity,
given both knowledge and search externalities. The role of liquidity is discussed.
We show intermediation helps by nancing more transactions with fewer assets, and,
more subtly, by ameliorating holdup problems. We also discuss some evidence.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly argued that the generation and implementation of new ideas are
major factors underlying economic performance and growth, and that nancial de-
velopment plays a role in this process.2 This project is our attempt to better under-
stand the issues in a model where decisions to innovate and implement new ideas
are endogenous. Based on the premise that some people are better at research and
others at development, the model incorporates a market for ideas in order to study
technology transfer. This market helps get ideas into the hands of those better able
to implement them, but is hindered by search, bargaining and commitment fric-
tions that slow reallocation and hence the advance of knowledge. Realistically, our
idea market is thin, agents are not price takers, and there are xed costs that are
hard to recoup due to holdup problems. Also, commitment problems impede credit,
generating a role for liquidity. We show how nancial intermediaries (e.g., banks)
contribute to growth in two ways: they reallocate liquidity to those that need it
most; and, perhaps more surprisingly, they ameliorate holdup problems.
By way of preview, in our setup, individual producers have access to the fron-
tier technology Z, but may also come up with ideas for innovation that increase
their own productivity to z > Z. This raises individual prot in the short run, but
later knowledge enters the public domain. In the simplest case, an innovator with
an idea tries to develop it on his own, and succeeds with probability , indexing
the quality of the match between the idea and his expertise. Innovations advance
individual productivity, and collectively determine the evolution of the technology
frontier. The model has a balanced-growth equilibrium, where the growth rate de-
pends on the number of innovators, their probabilities of success, the distance by
2An early proponent of the view that nancial factors are crucial for growth is Goldsmith (1967),
but there is by now a large literature. See Aghion and Howitt (1997), Levine (2005) and Acemoglu
(2009) for comprehensive treatments and bibliographies. See Greenwood et al. (2010, 2013), Opp
(2010) and Cole et al. (2011) for recent papers with more references.
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which innovations increase individual productivity, and the way they aggregate to
move the frontier. Naturally, since knowledge is (partially) a public good, equilib-
rium is ine¢ cient absent intervention, and we characterize the optimal corrective
subsidy. This benchmark model is, however, only a stepping stone toward studying
economies where individuals do not necessarily develop their own ideas.
As discussed in the literature, the question is this: When people come up with
new ideas, should they try to implement them on their own, or trade them to
others, say entrepreneurs who may be better at development, marketing and related
activities? Given heterogeneity in abilities, it is benecial if some specialize in
research and others in development. As Katz and Shapiro (1986) say: Inventor-
founded startups are often second-best, as innovators do not have the entrepreneurial
skills to commercialize new ideas or products.As The Economist (2005) puts it:
as the patent system has evolved, it ... leads to a degree of specialization that
makes business more e¢ cient. Patents are transferable assets, and by the early 20th
century they had made it possible to separate the person who makes an invention
from the one who commercializes it. This recognized the fact that someone who
is good at coming up with ideas is not necessarily the best person to bring these
ideas to market.And as Lamoreaux and Sokolo¤ (1999) say: The growth of the
U.S. economy over the nineteenth century was characterized by a sharp acceleration
of the rate of inventive activity and a dramatic rise in the relative importance of
highly specialized inventors as generators of new technological knowledge. Relying
on evidence compiled from patent records, we argue that the evolution of a market
for technology played a central role in these developments(emphasis added).
Our idea market has a liquidity problem, motivated by limited commitment,
which impedes credit. This is especially important because knowledge is di¢ cult
to collateralize  if you sell someone an idea on credit, and they renege, can you
repossess the information? Of course, that depends on intellectual property rights,
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patent protection, etc. Perhaps less obviously, it also depends on search frictions
that mean entrepreneurs do not know in advance who they will meet, and hence do
not know how much liquidity they may need. This leads to a role for intermediation,
which reallocates liquidity, and hence redirects resources to more productive users.
Here the resources in question are ideas. In fact, the theory applies to any factor
of production, but we frame the discussion in terms of ideas, consistent with these
factors expanding knowledge, and the notion that knowledge is a (partially) nonrival
good. Again, equilibrium is ine¢ cient, and we characterize optimal subsidies to
innovative and entrepreneurial activities. These results are novel, we think, because
of the interaction between knowledge and search externalities. We also show how it
is easier to achieve e¢ ciency with than without intermediation.
Although we formally model direct technology transfer, we understand that this
is but one mechanism by which innovators and entrepreneurs interact e.g., they
can also enter into longer-term partnerships, as with venture capital. We are pretty
sure that many of the same insights would emerge in a model with partnerships,
but concentrate on situations where innovators want to sell their ideas outright,
for several reasons. One very important advantage of direct transfers is that they
avoid strategic problems with joint implementation. Another is that they allow
innovators to go back to the drawing board to come up with more new ideas,
which is their forte, rather than getting tied up in development. Moreover, direct
technology transfers have been somewhat neglected in theory, and we think they are
worth studying, even if they are just one of many contributors to economic growth.
And we think it is important to model this market as one with frictions, although,
to focus on other issues, this paper abstracts from private information.
The focus instead is on how search, bargaining and liquidity problems interact
with innovation, and how this generates a role for nancial intermediation that
has not been previously recognized. As usual, one reason to study markets with
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these frictions is that we can think of perfect competitive markets as a limiting
case. However, people who study this market claim the frictions are realistic and
relevant.3 In his study of patent licensing contracts, e.g., Sakakibara (2010) says:
since there is no public market for patents, the price of patents is determined by
a private negotiation between a licensor and a licensee ...[and] once the matching
process is completed, the terms of the contract are negotiated between a licensor
and a licensee(emphasis added). Hence, we think this market is best described as
one with search and bargaining, and although in theory one can shut down these
frictions, as well as the liquidity problem, in practice it seems interesting to keep
them.4
Our goal is to build a framework that is tractable, at least to those who know
search, yet allows us to analyze the creation, transfer and di¤usion of knowledge
in a growth context. By incorporating key elements from other work we integrate
various insights from the literature. Thus, having knowledge entering the public
domain in the longer run follows much research on Schumpeterian growth (see the
references in footnote 2); the way productivity evolves is similar to the knowledge
production function in Jones (1999); and the role of banks is related to King and
Levine (1993). Yet our framework di¤ers in important ways from previous papers 
e.g., they do not have search and bargaining frictions. Specically, our framework
identies a strategic problem that arises from the interaction between bargaining
and nancial frictions: because investment in liquidity assets is sunk at the time
of negotiations, there is a holdup problem that implies that entrepreneurs under-
3Gans and Stern (2010) argue that one important source of ine¢ ciency in the market for ideas
is the lack of thickness. Hagiu and Yo¢ e (2013) discuss the high search costs on both sides of the
patent market.
4Also, using patent data from the nineteenth century, Lamoreaux and Sokolo¤ (1999) say it
was evident patent agents and lawyers often perform the functions of intermediaries in the market
for technology, matching inventors seeking to sell new technological ideas with buyers eager to
develop, commercialize, or invest in them. In this paper, patent agents and lawyers are not
modeled explicitly, but these observations clearly speak to the importance of search and matching
in the market.
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invest in liquid assets. We then argue that nancial intermediaries can alleviate
this problem. Also, search hinders innovative and entrepreneurial activity, and this
a¤ects the corrective tax-subsidy policies. In addition, we examine general equilib-
rium linkages between markets for ideas, labor markets and asset markets to uncover
some ndings not in the existing literature.5 Finally, we provide some evidence on
the relevance of the frictions. Using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we show
that technology transfer is positively correlated with nancial development across
countries, especially for small rms.
In the rest of the paper, we present a sequence of increasingly involved models,
as a way to build up to the general case. Section 2 characterizes equilibrium when
there is no technology transfer. Section 3 adds an idea market with perfect credit.
In these relatively simple versions, the key endogenous decisions concern participa-
tion by innovators and entrepreneurs, and e¢ ciency generally requires intervention.
Section 4 introduces credit frictions, shows how innovation is hindered by liquidity
shortages, and discusses ine¢ ciencies due to holdup problems. Section 5 adds in-
termediation, shows how this allows the economy to nance more transactions with
the same supply of liquid assets, and helps get around holdup problems by allowing
entrepreneurs to undo otherwise sunk investments. Section 6 discusses the evidence.
Section 7 concludes.6
5Silveira and Wright (2010) use a related setup to also study markets for ideas, but that paper
does not have growth. Moreover, it does not analyze entry/participation decisions, corrective
policies, banking, or implications for labor markets.
6As regards other work, Holmes and Schmitz (1990,1995) also have individuals di¤ering in
innovation and implementation ability, but only study perfect markets. Many people study credit
frictions and entrepreneurship; for recent papers and references, Cole et al. (2011), Chatterjee
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), Greenwood et al. (2013). Other related work includes Chaney (2008),
Berentsen et al. (2012) and Chu et al. (2012). Alvarez et al. (2008), Lucas (2009) and Lucas and
Moll (2011) also study similar issues using di¤erent approaches. In Lucas and Moll (2011), e.g.,
there is bilateral matching, but agents get ideas for free from anyone they meet, while here they
have to pay for them. Also, knowledge in our model is a rival good in the short run but a public
good in the long run; we have ex ante investments; we model liquidity and intermediation; and we
include a nontrivial labor market to interact growth and employment. There are also papers that
highlight creative destruction, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Klette and Kortum (2004); while
obviously important, creative destruction is not the focus of this paper.
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2 A Simple Model
Here we present a most rudimentary version of the environment to lay the foundation
for a general framework.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
A [0; 1] continuum of agents live forever in discrete time. Each period there is a
frictionless centralized market where agents trade a numeraire consumption good
c, labor h, and an asset a. Think of a as a Lucas (1978) tree in xed supply A.
There is no reproducible capital in the benchmark model, but Appendix 1 shows
how to add it. To generate balanced growth, assume that each unit of the asset
bears a dividend  of an intermediate good that is transformed into Z units of nal
consumption c, where Z is the aggregate state of knowledge, or productivity.7 Thus,
Z is the price of intermediate goods in terms of numeraire. Let w be the wage and
 the asset price. Then the value function for agents entering this market is
W (a; z;Z) = max
c;h;a0
fu(c)  h+ V (a0; Z 0)g (1)
st c = (+ Z) a+ wh  a0 + (z);
where u(c) satises the usual assumptions,  is the disutility of labor, V (a0; Z 0) is
the continuation value, and (z) is prot as a function of individual productivity z.
We interpret each individual as operating his own rm, although it is equivalent
to have him engage a manager. In either case,
(z) = max
H
fzf(H)  wHg ; (2)
where f(H) satises the usual assumptions and H is labor demand (individuals
may work for themselves, or for others, given a frictionless labor market). Output
f(H) is in units of the intermediate good, which is transformed into zf(H) units
7This assumption helps generate balanced growth because the value of asset grows at the rate
of the economy even though its supply is xed.
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of c. Individual z can di¤er from Z if an agent innovates. A fraction ni of the
agents have opportunities to innovate, which means they come up with new ideas,
but not all of them pan out: the success probability is , where  is a random draw
from Fi(), and subscript i indicates this is the CDF associated with innovators,
to be distinguished from the entrepreneurs introduced later. One can think of  as
capturing the quality of the idea vis-a-vis the skill of the individual.
A successful innovation increases individual productivity by a factor , so that
for those who try to innovate:
z =

Z(1 + ) with prob 
Z with prob 1   (3)
The number of successful innovations is N = ni
R
dFi() = niE, and the aggre-
gate state evolves according to Z 0 = G(N)Z. Knowledge is a public goods in the
long run, in the sense that it enters the public domain, and yields an advance in
aggregate productivity after one period (one can extend this to several periods).
Thus, aggregate knowledge is higher next period if more ideas are implemented
successfully today, G0(N)  0.
As an example, consider aggregating across individuals by
Z 0 = 
Z 1
0
z"jdj
1="
=  [1 N +N(1 + )"]1=" Z; (4)
where the second equality uses (3), and  is an exogenous component while " a¤ects
the substitutability of individual innovations.8 As special cases, before adjusting for
, " = 1 implies productivity next period is given by the average this period (we all
contribute equally to the frontier); " = +1 implies it is given by the maximum (we
stand on the shoulders of the best); and " =  1 implies it is given by the minimum
(we are dragged down by the worst). However, except for constructing examples,
8The simplicity of (4) is due to the fact that, although  is random, each success advances z by
a xed amount . We also solved the model with  random, but it added little other than notation.
Also note that, in this example, agents that fail to innovate use the frontier Z 0 next period, and
Z 0 < z is possible, although one can raise  if one wants to avoid this.
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we do not need functional forms, and the growth rate in general is similar to what
one gets with a standard knowledge production functions,
1 + g = Z 0=Z = G(N): (5)
2.2 Equilibrium
We seek a balanced growth equilibrium, where c, w and  grow at the same rate as
Z, while h is constant. To pursue this, rst eliminate h and  to rewrite (1) as
W (a; z;Z) =

w
(+ Z)a+ max
c
n
u(c)  
w
c
o
+

w
max
H
fzf(H)  wHg (6)
+ max
a0
n
V (a0; Z 0)  
w
a0
o
;
where it is understood that Z 0 = G(N)Z with N = niE. Notice W is linear in
wealth, and Wa = (+ Z)=w. The FOCs are
u0(c) = =w, zf 0(H) = w and =w = Va(a0; Z 0): (7)
The continuation value depends on whether an agent has an opportunity to innovate:
for those that do not V (a; Z) = W (a; Z;Z); for those that do
V (a; Z) = W (a; Z;Z) + E fW [a; Z(1 + );Z] W (a; Z;Z)g ; (8)
which adds the expected surplus. Inserting Va = Wa into the FOC for a0, we get the
Euler equation

w
 = 

w0
(0 + Z 0): (9)
Since the stationary solution  = Z=(1  ) is the unique bounded and non-
negative solution to (9), the asset must be priced fundamentally, by the present
value of its dividend stream; this will not necessarily be the case when we introduce
liquidity concerns. We also need the wage w, which we get from goods-market
clearing. In terms of supply,
S(w) = N(1 + )Zf(H1) + (1 N)Zf(H0) + AZ;
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where H1 solves (2) for successful innovators and H0 solves it for the rest. Notice
from the FOCs Z(1 + )f 0(H1) = w and Zf 0(H0) = w that H0 and H1 depend only
on w=Z, and that S 0 (w) < 0. In terms of demand, the FOC u0(c) = =w implies
D0(w) > 0. Balanced growth in this model requires u(c) = log(c) (Waller 2011),
which means D = w= does not depend on Z. Setting S(w) = D(w), we get
w
Z
=  [N(1 + )f(H1) + (1 N) f(H0) + A] : (10)
Since H1 and H0 depend only on the normalized wage w = w=Z, so does this
condition, and there is a unique equilibrium w that clears the market. From w, all
the other endogenous variables follow easily.
As an example, suppose f(H) = 1 exp( H). Then prot maximization implies
f(H1) = 1  w=Z(1 + ) and f(H0) = 1  w=Z. This makes supply linear, S(w) =
Z (1 +N + A)   w, so we can solve explicitly for w = (1 + N + A)= (1 + ),
c = w= and so on. Although this example is simple, for any increasing and concave
f(H) the results are basically the same. In general, the growth rate g is given by
(5), which depends on the number of ideas implemented, N = niE. It is easy to
see how the equilibrium is a¤ected by changes in parameters. Thus, as the average
match between ideas and skills, parameterized by Fi, improves, g increases, along
with w and c. An improvement in the overall quality of ideas, captured by , has
similar e¤ects. An increase in A raises c and w, through a wealth e¤ect, but cannot
a¤ect the growth rate g in this version of the model; it can below, however, due to
liquidity considerations.
2.3 Entry
The e¤ects just discussed are fairly mechanical. We now endogenize the choice
by individuals to participate in the innovative process. Thus, suppose that the ni
potential innovators choose whether to engage in research at cost i. Let the number
of active innovators be ni 2 [0; ni]. Now, to calculate the expected individual gain
10
from trying to innovate, recall that the expected probability of success is E, and
the gain normalized by Z is  = (1  0)=Z, with 1 = Z(1 + )f(H1) wH1 and
0 = Zf(H0) wH0. Then, sinceW is linear in wealth with slope =w, the expected
gain from attempting to innovate is i = = wE. This means the number of active
innovators in equilibrium is:
ni =
8<:
0 if i > i
[0; ni] if i = i
ni if i < i
(11)
As shown in Figure 1, the balanced growth path can now be characterized by two
curves in (ni; w) space, one representing entry (11), and the other market clearing
(10), except now N = niE, rather than N = niE, since there are only ni active
innovators.
H0 H1 w ni c  g N
i " " " # # # 0 # #
A " 0 0 0 # 0 0 # #
 " 0 0 0 # 0 " # #
 " # ? " ? " 0 ? ?
 " # # " ? ? 0 ? ?
 " 0 0 0 0 0 " 0 0
Table A: E¤ects of Parameters in Basic Model
Notes: Parameters: i: research cost, A: asset supply, : dividend, : technology improvement, :
disutility of labor, : discount factor; Endogenous variables: H0; H1: employment, w: normalized
wage, ni: active innovators, c: consumption, : asset price, g: growth rate, N : no. of successful
innovations
In this version of the model, the entry decision gives a horizontal line at w =
E=i, while the market clearing curve is strictly increasing, so they intersect
uniquely. The solution is interior, ni 2 (0; ni), as long as i is not too high or too
low. An increase in i shifts the entry curve down, reducing ni and growth. So does
an increase in A, this time through a shift in the market clearing condition. In
terms of employment, which is one of the variables that interest us most, an increase
in i raises both H0 and H1, but not necessarily H = NH1 + (1   N)H0, because
N falls. Several other results are summarized in Table A.
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2.4 E¢ ciency
Having described the equilibrium growth path, we now turn to e¢ ciency. Consider
the planners problem:
J(Z) = max
c;H0;H1;ni
fu(c)   [NH1 + (1 N)H0]  ini + J [G(N)Z]g
st c = NZ(1 + )f(H1) + (1 N)Zf(H0) + AZ,
where the constraint ni 2 [0; ni] is implicit, as is N = niE. The FOC for an interior
ni implies
i = fu0(c) [Z(1 + )f(H1)  Zf(H0)]  (H1  H0) + V 0(Z 0)G0(N)ZgE: (12)
The RHS of (12) is the marginal social benet of innovative activity: the rst term
in braces is the utility change due to output increasing; the second is the change
in the disutility of working; the third is the discounted benet of knowledge in the
future V 0(Z 0)G0(N)Z. All this is multiplied by the average success rate, E. The
envelope condition is
J 0(Z) =
1
Z
+ J 0(Z 0)G(N) =
1
Z
+
G(N)
Z(1 + g)
+
2G(N)2
Z(1 + g)2
+ ::: =
1
Z(1  ) : (13)
Notice how this takes account of knowledge lasting forever.
Combining (13) and (12), we have
i =

u0(c)Z +
G0(N)
rG(N)

E (14)
where r  1=   1. The analogous equilibrium condition is i = u0(c)ZE, which
clearly entails too few innovators, because they ignore the external long-run impact
of the knowledge they create. This is of course easily corrected by a subsidy  i that
reduces the cost of innovative activity to i   i nanced by lump-sump taxes, and,
with our utility function, these taxes a¤ect leisure but nothing else. We summarize
all of this as follows:
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Proposition 1 In the model without a market for ideas where ni is determined by
entry, there is a unique interior equilibrium as long as i is not too high or low.
Absent intervention, it is ine¢ cient. The optimal policy, which yields e¢ ciency, is
a subsidy  i = G0(N)E=rG(N) > 0:
3 Technology Transfer with Perfect Credit
Results related to Proposition 1 can be found in textbooks on growth (see foot-
note 1), but we wanted to lay out these implications as a benchmark. The next
step is to consider the case where there is a frictional idea market, combining search
externalities with the knowledge externalities captured above.
3.1 A Market for Ideas
We now introduce entrepreneurs who, for ease of presentation, do not come up
with their own ideas, but may have comparative advantage at implementation. The
measure of potential entrepreneurs is ne, while ni is again the measure of potential
innovators, and the rest of the population, with measure 1   ni   ne, work and
consume but get involved in neither innovative or entrepreneurial activity. Each
period, before the centralized market convenes, there is a decentralized market where
an entrepreneur e and innovator i might meet bilaterally.9 according to a standard
matching function (ni; ne), where nj  nj is the measure of active type j = i; e.
Thus, the meeting probability in this market is j = (ni; ne)=nj for type j, and
constant returns to scale in  implies that j depends only on market tightness,
ne=ni. Later we endogenize nj by assuming type j can participate at cost j, but
we begin with nj = nj, say because j = 0.
Each period, an active innovator draws i from Fi (i), then matching begins.
Given i, if i meets e, the latter draws e from Fe(eji). By assumption, i and
9This way of intergrating models of frictional decentralized trade and frictionless centralized
trade, by having alternating markets, follows Lagos and Wright (2005).
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e both observe (i; e). Although private information is of course relevant in these
kinds of markets, we abstract from that to concentrate on other frictions.10 There
are gains from trade in the event that e > i. In this case, i and e bargain over a
payment p that the latter will make in the next centralized market, where for now e
can commit to any p in the relevant range. Given there is no private information, we
use generalized Nash bargaining (one can get the same results using various strategic
bargaining solutions). Let  be the bargaining power of e. The outside option for e
is using the public technology Z, and the outside option for i is trying to implement
the idea on his own. Recalling that  = (1   0)=Z is the gain from successfully
implementing, one can easily show generalized Nash bargaining delivers
p = p(e; i) = [i + (1  )e]: (15)
Whoever takes the idea out of a meeting tries to implement it and improve his
productivity from z = Z to z = Z(1 + ). To reduce notation, ideas are rival goods
in the short run, so if i sells his idea he cannot also try to implement it (this can be
relaxed, as in Silveira and Wright 2010, where ideas can be rival, partly public, or
pure public goods). After the idea market, agents enter the centralized market, as
in Section 2. Exiting the centralized market, the continuation values, now indexed
by type i or e, are
V i(a; Z) = W i(a; Z;Z) +

w
Ei + i(1  )
w
E^(e   i) (16)
V e(a; Z) = W e(a; Z;Z) + e

w
E^(e   i); (17)
where the expected increase in the success rate due to trade is given by
E^(e   i) = E(e   ije > i) Pr(e > i):
10We also mention that at least some parts of the theory work ne in the special case where
(i; e) is nonrandom, in which case there is no issue about information in a particular bilateral
meeting. One can also reinterpret the probability 1 e that emeets no one in terms of information
frictions e.g., e meets someone with an idea outside his area of expertise, and hence chooses to
not trade lest he gets a lemon. See Lester et al. (2012) or Li et al. (2012) for recent, and less trivial,
analyses of information frictions in related search-and-bargaining models.
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In particular, compared with (8), the second term in (16) reects the fact that
i can still try to implement his idea, while the last term reects the fact that he
might get an opportunity to sell it. The number of successful innovations is now
N = niEi + neeE^(e   i):
The rst term is the baseline success rate when ideas are implemented by i, while
the second captures additional successes gained by technology transfer in matches
where e > i. The growth rate is still 1+g = G(N), but N and g now additionally
depends on the distribution Fe and the matching function . Given nj = nj is xed,
g is independent of , which divides the gains from trade but does not determine
which trades get made. Also, g is independent of A (although again that changes
below).11
3.2 Entry
We now endogenize ni and ne by considering two-sided entry, which works in our
model, because f (H) is concave (it does not work in typical search models, e.g.
Pissarides 2000, where the technology is linear, and one can only consider one-sided
entry). Thus, i and e choose whether to enter the idea market, at costs i and e.
The measure of active innovators ni still satises (11), except now the cost threshold
increases to i = u0(c)Z[Ei + i(1  )E^(e   i)], since i is willing to pay more
to participate when there are potential options to sell ideas. Similarly, the measure
of active entrepreneurs satises
ne =
8<:
0 if e > e
[0; ne] if e = e
ne if e < e
(18)
11It is easy to work out examples with G(N) =  [1 N +N(1 + )"]1=" and f(H) = 1  
exp( H), as in Section 2. Suppose, e.g., that e = 1 with probability 1 while i is uniform on
[0; 1]. Then " = 1 implies g = [ni + (ni; ne)]=2  (1  ); " =1 implies g = (1 + )  2; and
" =  1 implies g =   1.
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with e = u0(c)ZeE^(e   i). Equilibrium solves (18) and (11), plus market
clearing (10). Appendix 2 shows there is a unique interior equilibrium, nj 2 (0; nj)
for j = i; e, as long as i and e are not too high or too low.
3.3 E¢ ciency
The planners problem for this version of the model is given by
J(Z) = max
c;H0;H1;ni;ne
fu(c)   [NH1 + (1 N)H0]  ini   ene + J [G(N)Z]g
st c = NZ(1 + )f(H1) + (1 N)Zf(H0) + ZA,
with the implicit constraints nj 2 [0; nj] and N = niEi + (ni; ne)E^(e   i).
Here we take as given the matching process, and that payment p is determined by
bargaining with parameter , but we choose entry on both sides of the idea market.
Assuming an interior solution, we get the FOCs for (ni; ne),
i =

u0(c)Z +
G0(N)
rG(N)

[Ei + iE^(e   i)]
e =

u0(c)Z +
G0(N)
rG(N)

eE^(e   i);
where it is understood that  is evaluated at (ni; ne). Comparing this with equilib-
rium, we get the optimal subsidies, as summarized by:
Proposition 2 With an idea market and two-sided entry, as long as i and e are
not too high or low, there is a unique interior equilibrium. Absent intervention, it
is ine¢ cient. The optimal policy, which yields e¢ ciency, involves subsidies
 i =
G0(N)[Ei + iE^(e   i)]
rG(N)
  u0 (c)ZE^(e   i)

(1  ) 
ni
  i

 e =
G0(N)eE^(e   i)
rG(N)
  u0 (c)ZE^(e   i)



ne
  e

:
These results are somewhat novel relative to growth theory without search fric-
tions. To explain them, note than in addition to the ine¢ ciencies due to knowledge
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externalities discussed above, there are now search externalities. The former are
corrected by the rst terms in  i and  e, while the latter are corrected by the sec-
ond terms. The corrections for search externalities are of course related to Hosios
(1990) general conditions for e¢ ciency, saying that agentsbargaining powers should
be commensurate with their contributions to the matching process. For entrepre-
neurs this means  = ene=, and for innovators 1   = ini=. Constant returns
in  implies that one holds i¤ the other holds, so the Hosios conditions yield e¢ cient
participation by both i and e. Even if  satises the Hosios condition, however, we
naturally still want to subsidize participation due to knowledge externalities. When
the Hosios condition fails, the optimal policy balances search and knowledge exter-
nalities. While it is not technically di¢ cult to derive these results, we submit that
they contain a lot of economic content.
As a special case, we can x ne = ne but determine ni through entry, to better
compare the results with Section 2. In Figure 1, when the idea market was closed,
the entry condition (11) gave a horizontal line at w. Now it gives a curve slop-
ing downward due to congestion e¤ects: bigger ni reduces the arrival rate i and
hence the return to innovation. Market clearing (10) still generates an increasing
curve, so we still have a unique equilibrium, and the qualitative e¤ects of parameter
changes are the same as in Table A. There are also new e¤ects related to search and
bargaining. Increasing  shifts down the entry curve, reducing ni, N , g, w and c.
Increasing the matching rate i, either because  improves or ne increases, shifts up
both curves, increasing w and N but lowering H0 and H1. Notice higher i means
higher growth, even though ni might go up or down. Also notice that for any  > 0
there is a holdup problem: at the time of bargaining, i is sunk, and so cannot a¤ect
p. In the extreme case  = 1 the entry curve is again horizontal, and an increase
in i implies ni falls, but w and N do not change. This is a complete crowding-out
e¤ect, with the fall in n
i
exactly o¤setting the improvement in matching. For  < 1,
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the holdup problem is still there but less drastic.
We summarize this to facilitate comparison with Proposition 1 as follows:
Proposition 3 With an idea market and one-sided entry by i, as long as i is
not too high or low, there is a unique interior equilibrium. Absent intervention,
it is generally ine¢ cient. The optimal policy, which yields e¢ ciency, is the  i in
Proposition 2.
4 Technology Transfer with Imperfect Credit
We begin with the ns xed and an exogenous credit constraint. Then we endogenize
both.
4.1 Exogenous Liquidity
Suppose that when e meets i in the idea market his payment must satisfy p  x.
There are two standard interpretations. One is that i insists on quid pro quo, e is
holding transferable assets worth x, and he cannot hand over more than he has (as
in monetary models like those surveyed in Williamson and Wright 2010). Another
is that e can promise to pay p to i in the next centralized market, but then e can
renege, so i will only accept promises collateralized by the value x of es pledgeable
assets (as in credit models like those surveyed in Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010). On the
rst interpretation there is nalization when the idea changes hands; on the second
there is deferred settlement; but other than this irrelevant timing di¤erence, nothing
depends on the interpretation. In any case, for an idea to be traded to happen, two
conditions have to be met: as always, e must have a higher probability of success,
i  e; and now, x must be big enough to cover is reservation price, i. Thus,
we need i  minfe; x=g.
If the bargaining solution derived in Section 3, without the liquidity constraint,
satises p  x, then p =  [i + (1  )e] as before. It is easy to check that the
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liquidity constraint is not violated i¤
e  B

i;
x


 1
1  
 x

  i

: (19)
When e > B(i; x=), the unconstrained bargaining outcome p is infeasible, which
leads to the following: if x=  i the agents close the deal with e paying p = x < p;
and if x= < i there is no trade because x cannot cover is reservation price. As
shown in Figure 2, there is no trade in the region labeled A0 because there are no
gains from trade; there is no trade in A3 because e cannot meet is reservation price;
there is unconstrained trade in A1 where e pays p; and there is constrained trade in
A2 where e pays p = x.12
The number of successful innovations is given by
N = niEi + niiE(e   i;x); (20)
where the expected increase in the success rate due to trade is now
E(e   i;x) = E (e   ijminfe; x=g > i) Pr (minfe; x=g > i) ;
less than it was with perfect credit. We can still write goods-market supply and
demand as above, although there is now an additional e¤ect on supply coming
through N , since  depends on x and w. Appendix 3 shows by example that this
can lead to multiplicity, but we can still guarantee uniqueness if  is not too big, as
we assume from now on.13
12Again one can write down strategic bargaining models that generate this outcome. Also, note
that the results partly depend on ideas being indivisible, so i cannot give e part of it. Still, they
could trade using a lottery e pays p, then only gets the idea with probability . As Silveira and
Wright (2010) show, if one allows lotteries, the main results go through, in the sense that there
are still some meetings where i ine¢ ciently keeps his idea even though e > i.
13To see how supply can be nonmonotone, derive
S0(w) = N
f 0(H1)
f 00(H1)
+ (1 N) f
0(H0)
f 00(H0)
+ Z[(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)]dN
dw
: (21)
The rst two terms capture the result that, holding N xed, higher w lowers hours and output.
The nal term is positive, however, because higher w relaxes the liquidity constraint, spurring
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4.2 Endogenous Liquidity
The next important step is to endogenize x. First, from the total supply A, assume
that a fraction A1 = A of the assets are liquid i.e., they are transferable or pledge-
able while the remaining A0 = (1   )A are not. Hence, only A1 facilitate trade
in the idea market, although A0 can always be traded in the centralized market.
While the stock A1 is exogenous, the price and hence the value of liquid assets is en-
dogenous, and this is what matters, since we now constrain p by x = (+ Z) a
0
1=Z,
where a
0
1 is the individual holdings of liquid assets. While it is certainly interesting
to ask why certain assets can or cannot be used to facilitate trade in certain markets,
we follow much good work (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 or Holmstrom and Tirole
2011) and simply impose this but as a special case we can set  = 1, so that all
assets are liquid.14 In any case, in general, agents now hold a portfolio a = (a0; a1).
The dividend on both assets is still , while the price of aj is now j. The gross
return on Aj is
1 + rj =
0j + Z
0
j
: (22)
As before, the illiquid asset A0 must trade at the fundamental price, 0 = Z=(1 
), which means 1 + r0 = (1 + g) =. This is not necessarily true for the liquid asset
A1, however. Dene the spread by
s  r0   r1
1 + r1
=
(1 + g)1
(01 + Z 0)
  1: (23)
This is the marginal cost of liquidity i.e., the return one sacrices by holding A1.
Figure 2 still applies, with x = (+ Z) a01=Z endogenous but predetermined
in the meeting. In addition to the equilibrium conditions described above, we now
trade and innovation. Heuristically, this can lead to multiplicity for the following reason: When w
is higher there is less to gain from improving productivity (we are saying more than  falls with w,
we are saying the di¤erence 1   0 falls). This lowers is reservation price, making it more likely
that trade will happen and implementation will succeed. Through this channel, higher w can lead
to more innovation, and as always more innovation leads to higher w.
14One interesting extension is to endogenize the quantity of liquid assets by modelling how indi-
viduals, and the economy as a whole, accumulate liquid assets over time to improve the allocation
of ideas.
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have to clear the market for A1, which occurs when s equates demand and supply.
In terms of demand, consider rst agents who have no possibility of buying ideas
(everybody except active type e agents). Since they will not sacrice return for
liquidity, we have the following: they are happy to hold any amount of A1 if the
spread is s = 0; they demand 0 if s > 0; and they demand arbitrarily large positions
if s < 0. In other words, demand for A1 by these agents is horizontal at s = 0. Now
consider active type e agents. Integrating across the Aj regions in Figure 2, their
payo¤ in the idea market is:
V e(a; Z) = W e(a; Z;Z) + e

w
Z
A1
(e   i)Z + e 
w
Z
A2
[eZ  a1(1 + Z)]
In Appendix 4, we show that the FOC for es choice of x = (+ Z) a01=Z is given
by s = `(x), where s is the spread and `(x) is the marginal benet of liquidity,
`(x)  eF 0i
 x

Z 1
x


e   x


dFe

ej x


(24)
 e
Z x

0
n
1  Fe
h
B

i;
x


ji
io
dFi(i):
The rst term on the RHS of (24) gives the increase in es expected payo¤ from
not losing deals because he cannot meet is reservation price, while the second gives
the decrease from paying more when he could have closed the deal at p = x. The
FOC `(x) = s equates the marginal benet and cost of liquidity. We also have to
consider the SOC, which is not trivial in this kind of model, in general, but with
that in mind, as in Wright (2010), we can describe market demand for liquidity
L(x) as follows. First, if s < 0 then demand is unbounded. Second, if s = 0 then
type e agents satiate in liquidity at x(0). In this case type e in aggregate demand
nex (0), and, if there is any left, others hold the rest, which they are happy to do at
s = 0. Third, if s > 0 is not too big then type e agents demand the x = x (s) that
solves s = `(x), and everyone else demands 0. Finally, s > 0 is too big then type e
as well as everyone else demand x = 0. One can also show that market demand is
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decreasing.15
4.3 Asset Market Equilibrium
To complete the analysis of the market for A1, consider supply. Again, A1 is xed
but the real value of liquid assets depends on the price 1, or equivalently the spread
s. Using the denitions of x, r0 and r1, and setting neae = A1 for all s > 0, we can
write
s = s(x) =
1ae
x
  1 = x  A1=ne
x
  1: (25)
This relation gives the spread required to make the real value of A1 equal to x. Since
s(0) =  1, s0(x) > 0 and s(1) = r, supply and demand intersect uniquely. Write
asset market equilibrium as AM(x; w) = 0, where
AM(x; w)  s(x)  L [x=( w)] : (26)
From this we get a unique market-clearing x for any w, with @x=@ w < 0.
Asset-market equilibrium is shown in Figure 3, for di¤erent values of  that
translate into di¤erent demand, and di¤erent values of A that translate into dif-
ferent supply. Note that `(x) can become negative, but market demand L(x) is
truncated below by the axis, since s < 0 always implies excess demand. Clearly,
e can be satiated at an x (0) that is below the value of x that allows him to close
the deal in every idea market meeting. This can only occur if  < 1, however, as
one can check  = 1 and s = 0 implies e chooses x so that he can close deals with
probability 1. Heuristically, when e buys liquid assets he is making an investment
at cost s (the forgone return). If  < 1, he has to share the surplus generated by
this investment with i another holdup problem and so e underinvests in liquidity
unless  = 1. Notice that  = 1 does not generally satisfy the Hosios condition,
15For details, again, see Wright (2010). The result that e satiates in liquidity at x (0) can best
be understood by noting there is always some x^ such that x > x^ implies the second term in (24)
dominates the rst, and so the marginal value of liquidity is negative, because any additional x
only increases p. This is standard in models with liquidity constraints and Nash bargaining.
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however, so with endogenous entry e¢ ciency requires  = 1 to avoid this holdup
problem, plus subsidies to promote optimal participation (see below).
In any case, if A1 is above some threshold A1, dened below, then s = 0; and
if A1 < A1, then s > 0. This much is standard (Geromichalos et al. 2007; Lagos
and Rocheteau 2008; Lester et al. 2012). The novelty here concerns deriving the
implications for innovation and growth. To pursue this, recall the goods market
clearing condition (10), which we reproduce as GM(x; w) = 0 with
GM(x; w)  w

 N(1 + )f [H1( w)]  (1 N) f [H0( w)]  A: (27)
As long as  is not too big, this delivers x as a function of w, with @x=@ w  0.
Equilibrium is characterized by (x; w) satisfying asset- and goods-market clearing,
(26)-(27), from which we can easily nd the rest of the variables. As shown in Figure
4, existence and uniqueness are immediate, given that  is not too big.
H0 H1 w x s c g N
 " # # " " # " " "
A0 " # # " # # " ? ?
 " # ? " ? ? " ? ?
 " # # " # # ? ? ?
 " # # " " # " " "
 " # # " " " " " "
Table B: E¤ects of Parameters with Imperfect Credit
Notes: Parameters: : fraction of liquid assets, A0: illiquid assets, : technology improvement,
: disutility of labor, : discount factor, : bargaining power; Endogenous variables: H0; H1:
employment, w: normalized wage, x: liquidity, s: spread, c: consumption, g: growth rate, N : no.
of successful innovations
Table B reports the e¤ects of parameters when A1 < A1. An increase in , e.g.,
shifts the AM curve up while GM is una¤ected, increasing x, w and g. Intuitively,
low  makes e try to economize on liquidity, since he gets less of the surplus when
buying ideas, and so he more frequently cannot meet the reservation price, which
reduces idea trade and innovation. One can also show growth increases if matching
frictions are reduced or ni increases, but not necessarily if ne increases. Consider a
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rise in ni. This shiftsGM andAM up, promoting growth via two e¤ects. First, there
are more meetings in the idea market. Second, since the arrival rate e increases,
e holds more liquidity. An increase in ne, however, while still increasing meetings,
reduces rather than increases e, which has a negative e¤ect on liquidity.
4.4 Entry and E¢ ciency
As in the previous versions, we now consider entry by i. Appendix 5 shows equi-
librium exists, although may not be unique. It also makes the point that liquidity
does not necessarily promote growth i.e., we can get @ni=@A1 < 0. And again we
derive the optimal subsidy  i simply by comparing the equilibrium and planners
solution. We summarize the main results as follows:
Proposition 4 With an idea market and imperfect credit, for xed nj there is a
unique equilibrium if  is not too big. With entry by i, equilibrium exists and ni 2
(0; ni) if i is not too big or too small. It is ine¢ cient unless three conditions are
satised: entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power,  = 1; the supply of liquid
assets is abundant, A1  A1  (1   0) (1  )ne=; and the subsidy is set to
 i =
G0(N)[Ei + iE^(e   i)]
rG(N)
+ u0(c)ZE^(e   i)i:
5 Technology Transfer with Intermediation
It is now time to consider nancial intermediation, and how that may contribute to
innovation and growth.16
5.1 Banking
As is now becoming standard in this type of model, banks are introduced as in
Berentsen et al. (2007) (see, e.g., Chiu and Meh 2011 or He et al. 2014 for other
16In spirit, the following discussion is somewhat related to King and Levine (1993), although we
think it is fair to say that the microfoundations are very di¤erent.
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applications). These banks accept deposits at interest rate rd and make loans at rl,
although in equilibrium competition yields rl = rd (this is not true in Chiu and Meh
2011, which has a transactions cost). For simplicity here borrowers can commit to
repay bank loans, and bankers can commit to honor deposits, in the next centralized
market, although one can endogenize these decisions. After meeting and observing
the realization (i; e) in the idea market, e can choose to deposit his assets in, or
borrow assets from, banks. Lack of commitment between e and i means that claims
on liquid assets are still needed to trade in the idea market, even with commitment
between e and his bank.17
For e in the centralized market, we now have
W (a1; d; z;Z) =

w
(1 + Z)a1 + max
c
n
u(c)  
w
c
o
+

w
max
H
fzf(H)  wHg
+ max
a01
n
V k(a01; Z
0)  
w
1a
0
1
o
  
w
Zd(1 + rd);
which is the same as (6) in the baseline model except for the last term, which
gives the real value of debt obligations to a bank d (if one has deposits in the bank
then d < 0). Without loss in generality, bank loans are settled every period in the
centralized market, and for this discussion we set A0 = 0, since as demonstrated
above illiquid assets do not a¤ect growth. Then in the idea market, after observing
(i; e), i and e bargain knowing that e can always get a loan at interest rate rd.
The generalized Nash solution then delivers
p = p(e; i; rd) = 

i + (1  ) e
1 + rd

:
It is easy to see the following: e < i(1 + rd) implies e will deposit x and not
trade, because the gain does not cover the interest cost; and if e  i(1 + rd) then
17By banks we mean any institution that can reallocate liquidity, in the spirit of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). Chiu and Meh (2010) allow a xed cost  to banking, and can capture nancial
development as a reduction in . Similarly, Silveira and Wright (2010) assume that when e is short
of liquidity he can try to raise additional funds, but only succeeds with probability &, so nancial
development is an increase in &. Here we set  = & = 0, and nancial development is captured
by comparing the outcomes with and without banking. One can also in principle introduce a
parameter governing the e¢ ciency of the banking sector by assuming that only a fraction of agents
can access banks.
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e trades, depositing x   p(e; i) when e < B(i; x) and borrowing p(e; i)   x
when e > B(i; x), with
B(i; x)  1 + rd
1  
 x

  i

:
See Figure 5. Now asset-market clearing requires rd = s, where the spread is the
same as in Section 4. Goods market clearing is also the same as before, with
N = niE(i) + niiE [e   ije > i(1 + rd)] Pr [e > i(1 + rd)] ;
since trade happens i¤ e > i(1 + rd). Finally, deposits and loans have to net out,
which requires
e
Z
A1[A2[A3
p(e; i)  x, with = when rd > 0.
Summarizing, equilibrium now consists of (x; rd; w) clearing the asset and goods
market, plus the netting of deposits and loans, which after simplication yield:
(x  A=ne) =x = 1 + rd (28)
 [N(1 + )f(H1) + (1 N) f(H0) + A] = w (29)
e
Z 1
1+rd
0
Z 1
i(1+rd)

i +
(1  )e
1 + rd

dFedFi = x for rd > 0 (30)
We can write (29) as GM(rd; w) = 0 in (rd; w) space, with @ w=@rd < 0. Similarly,
we can write (28) and (30) as BM(rd; w) = 0 with
BM(rd; w)  A
ne [1  (1 + rd)]  e
Z 1
1+rd
0
Z 1
i(1+rd)

i + (1  ) e
1 + rd

dFedFi
dening another negative relationship between r and w. Given these two downward
sloping curves, we can show existence, but not uniqueness. There are two types of
equilibria: one with rd = 0 arises when A1 is big, in which case ideas are traded
whenever e > i; and one with rd > 0 arises when liquid assets are scarce. Impor-
tantly, the relevant threshold for su¢ cient liquidity is now A1 , which is below the
threshold A1 required for e¢ ciency in the economy without banking (see Proposition
5 below).
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5.2 The Roles of Intermediation
Banking here has two distinct roles. The rst concerns reallocating liquidity: a given
quantity A1 can be channeled to those who need it most, which is not generally e¢ -
cient without banks, because e do not know how much liquidity he will need before
he leaves the centralized market. This function is especially important when the
arrival rate e is low, because that makes e want to economize on liquidity. This
illustrates clearly how search interacts with liquidity considerations and intermedia-
tion. This is relevant to the extent that, as some people argue, there is a shortage of
liquid assets in reality (e.g., Caballero 2006). The second and more novel function of
banking is that it helps get around the holdup problem associated with investments
in liquidity by allowing entrepreneurs to undo these investments and hence increas-
ing their reservation payo¤s. Intuitively, without banks, when i asks for a high p, e
would like to claim that he shouldnt have to pay so much because he needs to cover
his cost, the spread s. But i counters that this is a sunk cost, which leads to a high
p and hence underinvestment in liquidity. When banks are open, however, e has the
option of depositing his assets, which in equilibrium earns rd = s, and therefore the
cost is not completely sunk.
Of course, not everyone can do this, since deposits can exceed loans only if rd = 0.
But since each individual behaves competitively with respect to banking, the threat
by e of putting his money in the bank and earning the going rate rd is credible in
bilateral negotiations. This is especially important when  is low, because then the
holdup problem is severe. This illustrates how bargaining interacts with liquidity
considerations and intermediation. The e¤ect has not been noticed, we think, be-
cause the related papers on intermediation and liquidity assume competitive pricing,
which means they ignore holdup problems. Bargaining is especially pertinent in the
idea market, which is su¢ ciently thin that the competitive price-taking hypothesis
is not compelling, and where there is often one-o¤ trade so that reputation may
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not overcome the problem. Therefore, nancial intermediation may be particularly
signicant in the context of technology transfer, innovation and growth. Table C re-
ports the e¤ects of parameters, assuming an equilibrium with rd > 0 exists uniquely.
An increase in , e.g., shifts the BM curve down while GM is una¤ected, reducing
rd, increasing w and raising N and g.18
H0 H1 w rd s c g N
 " # # " # # " " "
A0 " # # " # # " " "
 " # # " # # ? " "
 " # # " # # " " "
 " # # " # # " " "
Table C: E¤ects of Parameters with Intermediation
Notes: Parameters: : fraction of liquid assets, A0: illiquid assets, : disutility of labor, :
discount factor, : bargaining power; Endogenous variables: H0; H1: employment, w: normalized
wage, rd: deposit rate, s: spread, c: consumption, g: growth rate, N : no. of successful innovations
5.3 Entry and E¢ ciency
The last step in this version of the model is to again endogenize entry by i and
solve for the optimal subsidy. The results, veried in Appendix 6, are summarized
in Proposition 5 below. What we emphasize is that, compared to Proposition 4,
one can see explicitly the two functions of banks: e¢ ciency now requires a smaller
quantity of liquid assets; and we do not need  = 1, because banking eliminates the
holdup problem associated with investments in liquidity.
Proposition 5 With an idea market and intermediation, for xed nj there exists an
equilibrium. With entry by i, an equilibrium with rd = 0 exists if e = (ni; ne)=ne
is not too big. It is generally ine¢ cient unless two conditions are satised: A1 
A1  
A1, where

 = e
Z 1
0
Z 1
i
[i + (1  )e]dFe(eji)dFi(i)  1;
18The e¤ects of  is not reported in Table C because its change will shift both GM and BM ,
and always leads to ambiguous results.
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and  i is set as in Proposition 4. We do not need the third condition in Proposition
4 for the economy without banking,  = 1.
6 Some Evidence
Here we report some evidence to support the case that technology transfer can be an
important part of the innovation process, and that credit imperfections hinder this
process. Our empirical analysis makes use of the rm level data obtained from the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys conducted between 2002 and 2005. The whole sam-
ple includes 4059 rms across 33 countries. We follow closely the statistical analysis
in Carluccio and Fally (2009), but appropriately modify the sample and choice of
variables to address our own research questions. Before going to detail, we highlight
two ndings: (i) in some countries (e.g., Germany), direct technology transfers from
outside parties are an important way for rms to acquire new technology; (ii) rms
use of technology transfer is positively correlated with the nancial development in
a country, particularly for small rms.
Using survey responses, we can determine whether a rm has acquired a new
technology in the period 2002-2005. Given our interest in direct technology transfer,
we restrict attention to arms length transfers from outside parties. In particular,
rms in our sample are asked to report the most important way that they acquired
new technology in the last 36 months. We focus on transfers through new licensing
or turnkey operations obtained from international sources, domestic sources, uni-
versities and public institutions. We do not include transfers resulting from hiring,
transfers from parent companies, internal development, and development in cooper-
ation with other partners. In Table 1 (all data tables are at the end of the paper), we
report cross-country summary statistics regarding the fraction of rms using direct
technology transfers, and its relationship to nancial development and rm size.
Direct transfers are an important source of technology acquisition in some coun-
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tries. In Germany, 12.6% of rms in the survey reported that the most important
way they acquire technology is through new licensing or turnkey operations from
international sources, domestic sources, universities and public institutions.
To study the e¤ects of intermediation on technology transfer, we follow the
literature and proxy nancial development of a country by the ratio of private credit
to GDP, taken from Beck et al. (1999). Table 2 indicates that, overall, a higher
level of nancial development is associated with higher rates of technology transfer.
The positive correlation is more signicant for smaller rms, and tends to become
smaller or even reversed as rm size increases. Tables 3-5 report results from three
regressions to uncover the e¤ects of nancial development. Other control variables
in the regression include market size, price of investment, openness, investment
level, rm size, presence of foreign capital and industry dummies.19 Table 3 reports
results from a simple OLS regression. This yields a positive relationship between
private credit to GDP and technology transfer, signicant at the 10% level. This
positive relation is strongly strengthened when the square of private credit to GDP
is introduced, signicant at the 1% level, when we control for rm and country
specic variables.
To deal with endogeneity issues, in Table 4, we follow Carluccio and Fally (2009)
and Djankov et al. (2007) to instrument for private credit over GDP by legal origin
and use 2SLS. This leads to considerably larger coe¢ cients than the OLS regressions.
Technology transfer is positively a¤ected by private credit to GDP, with signicant
results at the 1% level in all six specications. The strong positive e¤ects still exists
when controls for country and rm characteristics are excluded. Table 5 shows
results from a probit regression, which are similar in terms of economic conclusions.
The general pattern over the di¤erent specications is that the level of nancial
development has positive but diminishing e¤ects on technology transfer, and the
19Variable denitions accompany the Tables; See Carluccio and Fally (2009) for a more detailed
discussion of the statistical approach.
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e¤ect is greater for smaller rms. This is all broadly consistent with our theory.
While the above analysis focuses on how technology transfer depends on the
level of nancial development in a country, there is also an empirical literature that
studies how the decision to acquire technology depends on a rms own liquidity
and nancial constraints. Montalvo and Yafeh (1994), e.g., examine investment in
foreign technology by Japanese rms in the form of licensing agreements. They
conclude that liquidity is an important consideration in the rms decision to in-
vest in foreign technology.In particular, they nd that Cash ow has a positive
impact, and REALCF (cash ow of rms with limited access to main bank loans)
is always positive and signicant. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient of REALCF is much
higher than that of cash ow, implying that non-keiretsu rms are more liquidity
constrained than group-a¢ liated rms. Also, Gorodnichenko and Schnizter (2013)
study Business Environment and Enterprise Performances Surveys from 2002 to
2005, covering a broad array of sectors and countries, and containing direct mea-
sures of innovation and nancial constraints. They nd evidence that innovative
activity is strongly inuenced by nancial frictions.
Finally, our theory suggests banking enhances e¢ ciency because entrepreneurs
with access to banks are in a better position when negotiating with innovators,
and therefore acquire technology at better terms. Ideally, one would test this by
investigating the correlation between buyersaccess to nancing and the prices they
pay for technology transfers. Unfortunately, owing to the lack of reliable data, few
papers have examined this relationship.20 One exception is Sakakibara (2010), who
examined the determinants of patent prices using a unique dataset of 661 Japanese
patent licensing contracts. He found that, after controlling for the attributes of
licensors, licensees, contracts and patents, the size of a licensee has negative and
highly signicant e¤ect on the price of licensing, and concluded large licensees
20Researchers studying patent pricing told us that reliable public data was hard to nd because
the price of transactions and buyers characteristics are highly condential.
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appear to exercise greater bargaining power.To the extent that large rms tend to
have better access to nancing, as is often assumed, one can argue that the model
predictions are consistent with this evidence.
This discussion of evidence is brief, and in the future more empirical work could
be done to better uncover the importance of technology transfer, how it depends on
liquidity and nancial considerations, and the implications for growth. The papers
main goal has been to lay out a theoretical framework within which one can organize
such empirical work, and the discussion in this section is mainly an illustration of
how some simple observations support the general approach. We also believe that
a current shortage of denitive data should not stand in the way of considering new
models there is no reason to think that there will never in the future emerge more
information to better test these kinds of theories.
7 Conclusion
We conclude as we began by suggesting that the generation and implementation
of new ideas are major factors underlying economic performance and growth, and
that nancial considerations play a role in this process. By studying a series of
environments, increasing in complexity, the paper has constructed an endogenous
growth model with participation decisions by innovators and entrepreneurs, where
productivity increases with research and development. Progress is aided by the
exchange of ideas, since those who come up with them are not necessarily the best
at implementing them. In case it is not obvious, a well-functioning market for ideas
contributes to innovation in two ways: (i) it gets ideas into the hands of those who
are better able to develop them; and (ii) it encourages entry into innovative activity
in the rst place, since innovators not only can try to implement on their own, they
may have opportunities to trade their ideas. However, the market incorporated
search, bargaining and credit frictions that hinder trade. We did not model all of
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the institutional details, but tried to capture these frictions at an abstract level.
Other frictions, including private information, were downplayed, but it would surely
be interesting to bring them into the mix in future work.
A main goal was to see how intermediation a¤ects the market for ideas, and
thus a¤ects technology transfer, innovation and growth. One result is that banks
allow the economy to get by with fewer liquid assets, by reallocating them from
those that need them less to those that need them more. This helps get around
a basic search/matching problem that implies entrepreneurs do not always have
su¢ cient liquidity when they contact an innovator, since they did not know how
much liquidity they might need before contacting him. A perhaps more subtle re-
sult is that intermediaries also mitigate holdup problems in bargaining by allowing
entrepreneurs to undo otherwise sunk investments in liquidity. With or without in-
termediation, the framework provides several useful insights, e.g., how to optimally
subsidize innovative and/or entrepreneurial activity in the presence of search and
knowledge externalities. We studied existence, uniqueness, e¢ ciency and compara-
tive statics for a series of increasing intricate models. There is much left to do in
terms of theory, and empirical work, clearly, but we think we learned a lot from this
exercise.
33
Appendix 1: Capital
Consider a CRS technology f(K;ZH;ZT ), whereK is capital and T is a xed input,
say the talent of the owner. We subsume depreciation in the notation f . Here we
present the case where ni is endogenous while ne is xed. Consider the planners
problem (equilibrium is similar):
V (Z;K)= max

u(c)  [(1 N)H0+NH1]  ini + V

G(N)Z;K 0
	
st c= Nf [K1; Z(1 + )H1; Z(1 + )T ] + (1 N)f(K0; ZH0; ZT ) + ZA K 0
K= NK1+(1 N)K0;
plus ni 2 [0; ni] and N = niEi, where the choice is (c;H0; H1; K0; K1; K 0; ni). After
eliminating constraints, FOCs are:
H0 : u
0(c)Zf 0H= 
H1 : u
0(c)(1 + )Zf 1H= 
K1 : f
1
K= f
0
K
K 0 : u0(c) = V K(Z
0; K 0)
ni : i=Ei= (f
1 f 0 f 1KK1+f 0KK1)u0(c)  (H1  H0) + V Z [G(N)Z;K 0]G0(N)Z
where f 0H = fH(K0; ZH0; ZT ), etc. The envelope conditions are
VZ(Z;K) = u
0 (c) +V Z(Z
0; K 0)G(N)
VK(Z;K) = (f
0
K+1  )u0 (c) ;
where   N(1 + ) (f 1HH1 + f 1TT ) + (1 N) (f 0HH0 + f 0TT ) + A.
A balanced growth equilibrium has Z, c, K, f 1 and f 0 growing at rate Z 0=z =
G(N) while H0, H1 and ni are constant. By CRS,  is also constant, implying
VZ = =c(1  ). Then equilibrium is given by (H0; H1; K0; K1; ni; c;K;N) solving
N = niEi
G(N) = (f 0K+1  )
i=Ei = u
0(c)(f 1   f 0   f 1KK1 + f 0KK1)  (H1  H0) + 
G0(N)Z
c(1  )
c = f 0H=Z
c = Nf 1+(1 N)f 0+(1  )K  G(N)K + ZA
f 0H = (1 + )f
1
H
f 0k = f
1
k
K = NK1+(1 N)K0
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It is now straightforward to study this model following the analysis in the text, with
similar results. 
Appendix 2: Two-Sided Entry
We show there is a unique equilibrium in the two-sided entry model of Section 3, with
ni 2 (0; ni) and ne 2 (0; ne) if i and e are not too high or low. The equilibrium
conditions are
w=f 0H= N(1 + )f(H1) + (1 N)f(H0) + A (31)
i = ( w)[Ei+(1  )(ni; ne)
ni
E^(e i)]= w (32)
e = ( w)[
(ni; ne)
ne
E^(e i)]= w (33)
where N = niEi + (ni; ne)E^(e   i). Dene  = ne=ni, and write (31)-(33) as
i = ( w)[Ei+(1  )(1; )E^(e i)]= w (34)
e = ( w)
h
 (1=; 1) E^(e i)
i
= w: (35)
In ( w; ) space, the former gives a strictly increasing curve and the latter a strictly
decreasing curve. The unique intersection determines equilibrium ( w; ). Denote
this wage by w(i; e), where @ w=@i < 0 and @ w=@e < 0. Also, w(i; e) gets
arbitrarily large for entry costs su¢ ciently small.
The ( w; ) pair still needs to satisfy goods market clearing
w= = ni[Ei+(1; )E^(e   i)][(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)] + f(H0) + A;
and we need to check that (ni; ne) is interior,
ni =
w=  f(H0)  A
[Ei+(1; )E^(e   i)][(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)
2 (0; ni) (36)
ne = ni2 (0; ne): (37)
The numerator in (36) is a strictly increasing function of w and is 0 for an unique
w. So we can nd ^i and ^e such that w(^i; ^e)=   f(H0)   A = 0, implying
ni = ne = 0. By continuity, we can then nd i and e close to but bigger than ^i
and ^e such that(36)-(37) are satised. This establishes that ( w; ) is unique. To see
that (ni; ne) is unique, note that equilibrium is given by an intersection of two curves
in the (ni; ne) space. One is the strictly decreasing relationship between ni and ne
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implicitly dened by (31) given w; the other is the strictly increasing relationship
dened by (37) given . Then (ni; ne) is determined by the unique intersection. 
Appendix 3: Multiple Equilibria
Here we provide an example to show supply can be non-monotonic, and hence we
can get multiplicity, in the model of Section 4 without the assumption made in the
text that  is not too big. Set A = 0. Letting f(H) = 1   exp( H); it is easy to
solve for:
f [H0( w)] =

1  w if w  1
0 if w > 1
and f [H1( w)] =

1  w=(1 + ) if w  1 + 
0 if w > 1 + 
Given N , supply is
S =
8<:
Z [N(1 +    w) + (1 N)(1  w)] if w  1
Z [N(1 +    w)] if w 2 (1; 1 + )
0 if w  1 + 
To describe N( w), rst compute:
( w) =
8><>:
   w log(1 + ) if w  1
1 +    w
h
1  log

w
1+
i
if w 2 (1; 1 + )
0 if w  1 + 
Since 0( w) < 0 for w < 1 +  and (1 + ) = 0, x=( w) is strictly increasing
and approaches 1 as w ! 1 + . So  > x implies there is a w0 2 (0; 1 + ) such
that
min

x
( w)
; 1

=
 x
( w)
if w  w0
1 if w > w0
:
Moreover, we have
w0 =
 2 (0; 1] if x >    log(1 + )
(1; 1 + ) if x <    log(1 + )
andN = niE(i)+nii
R x

0
R 1
i
(e i)dFe(eji)dFi(i). Then, after simplication,
S 0( w) = Z
 
 1 0( w)nii x
( w)2
Z 1
x
( w)

e   x
( w)

dFe(ej x
( w)
)fi(
x
( w)
)
!
;
where 0( w) < 0 for w < 1 + .
Therefore supply can have a positive slope when the distribution is su¢ ciently
concentrated over the relevant region, as shown in Figure 6. Then it is easy to
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specify demand so that we get multiplicity. Note that the above construction uses
w < 1 +  as well as  > x. The restriction made in the text that  is not too big
rules this out and allows us to prove uniqueness. 
Appendix 4: Entrepreneurs
Here we formulate es maximization problem as in Section 4. Start with the intuitive
expression
V e(a0; a1; Z)
= (1  e)W e(a0; a1; Z;Z) + e
Z
A0
W e(a0; a1; Z;Z)
+e
Z
A1

eW
e

a0; a1   pZ
1 + Z
; Z;Z

+ (1  e)W e

a0; a1   pZ
1 + Z
; Z;Z

+e
Z
A2
feW e [0; 0; Z(1 + );Z] + (1  e)W e(0; 0; Z;Z)g
+e
Z
A3
W e(a0; a1; Z;Z):
The rst term is es payo¤ when he does not meet anyone. The second is his payo¤
when he meets i but there are no gains from trade. The third is his payo¤ from
(unconstrained) trade at p. The fourth is his payo¤ from (constrained) trade at p.
The nal term is his payo¤ to not trading because he cannot meet is reservation
price. Now algebra leads to
V e(a0; a1; Z) = W
e(a0; a1; Z;Z)+
e
w
Z
A1
(e i)Z+e
w
Z
A2
[eZ  a1(1 + Z)]
Notice a1 a¤ects the area of the di¤erent Aj regions, and hence the probability
of trade, as well as the terms of trade when the constraint binds, as seen in the inte-
grand of the last term. Consider now the portfolio choice (a00; a
0
1) in the centralized
market. Since the choice of illiquid asset a00 is actually irrelevant for es payo¤, given
illiquid assets are priced fundamentally, we can ignore it. For the liquid asset, it is
convenient to redene es choice as x = a01 (1 + Z) =Z, rather than a
0
1, analogous
to using real rather than nominal balances in monetary theory. Given this, write
~V e(0; x; Z) = V et (0; a1; Z) where
~V e(0; x; Z) = const +

wx
+
e
w
Z
0
Z
i
(e   i)dFe(eji)dFi(i)
+
e
w
Z
0
Z
B(i;x)
(e  x) dFe(eji)dFi(i):
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Then
sx0 =

(1 + g)1
(01 + Z 0)
  1

x0 =
(1 + g)1a
0
Z 0
  x0;
implying 1a
0 = (sx0Z 0 + x0Z 0) = (1 + g). Then we can rewrite es objective func-
tion in the centralized market maximization problem as
 sx+ e
Z x

0
Z B(i; x )
i
(e   i)dFe(eji)dFi(i)
+e
Z x

0
Z 1
B(i;
x

)
(e  x) dFe(eji)dFi(i):
Maximizing wrt x, using Leibniz Rule and a little algebra, we get the FOC s = `(x)
where `(x) is dened in (24). 
Appendix 5: Entry & Credit Frictions
Here we substantiate some claims made in Section 4. Equilibrium (ni; x; w;N)
satises
(1  )xne   A1   xneL

x
( w)
;ni

= 0 (38)
w= N(1 + )f [H1( w)]  (1 N) f [H0( w)]  A = 0 (39)
N   niEi   nii
Z x

0
Z 1
i
(e   i)dFe(eji)dFi(i) = 0 (40)
plus the entry condition
i > i(0) if ni = 0; i = i(ni) if ni 2 (0; ni) and i < i(ni) if ni = ni; (41)
where
i(ni) =

w
Ei +

w
(1  )(ni; ne)
ni
Z x
( w)
0
Z 1
i
(e   i)dFe(eji)dFi(i):
As ni increases, both the upward sloping GM curve and the downward sloping
AM curve shift up in (x; w) space. Therefore, (38)-(40) dene an increasing and
continuous function w = &w(ni) from [0; ni] onto [ w(0); w(ni)]. Moreover, (x; w)
pairs that satisfy (38)-(40) dene a function x = &x( w) with range [ w(0); w(ni)]:We
now need to check the entry condition. First, since i(ni) is strictly decreasing in
ni, for any w 2 [ w(0); w(ni)] and x = &x( w), there is a unique ni 2 [0; ni] satisfying
(41). So we can construct a continuous mapping from w 2 [ w(0); w(ni)] to [0; ni].
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Therefore, given the continuous increasing function &w(ni), this ensures that an
equilibrium exists.
Next we show that ni can decrease with A1. Given ni 2 (0; ni), we derive
A1
x
  xneL
0


dx+ nexL
0 x
2
0d w   xne dL
dni
dni = dA1
Gd w   [(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)] dN = 0
 
 1

dx+ 

x
2
0d w + dN   (Ei + i)dni = 0
 


w
(1  ) 
ni




dx+ Ed w  
"

w
(1  )d(

ni
)
dni

#
dni = 0
where
 =
Z x

0
Z 1
i
(e   i)dFe(eji)dFi(i)

 =
Z 1
x


e   x


fi
 x


dFe(eji)
G =
1

 N(1 + )f 0(H1)H 01( w)  (1 N) f 0(H0)H 00( w)
E() =

w2
Ei   
w
Ei0 +

w2
(1  ) 
ni
  
w
0(1  ) 
ni
 +

w
(1  ) 
ni


x
2
0
Note that E() > 0 at least for   1. Then we have

2664
dx
d w
dN
dni
3775 =
2664
dA1
0
0
0
3775
where
 =
26664
A
x
  xne L0 nexL0 x2 0 0  xne @L@ni
0 G  (1 + )f(H1) + f(H0) 0
 
 1


 x
2
0 1  (Ei + i)
  
w
(1  ) 
ni



E 0   
w
(1  )@(

ni
)
@ni

37775
One can show det() > 0 at least for   1. Then
det()
@ w
@A1
=  [(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)] (1  )

w

ni
(Ei + i)  

w
@( 
ni
)
@ni

So @ w=@A1 = 0 when  = 1 and @ w=@A1 > 0 when  2 (0; 1) for some 0 < 1.
Since @N=@ w = G= [(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)] > 0, we have @N=@A1 = 0 when  = 1
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and @N=@A1 > 0 when  2 (0; 1). Then we have
det()
@ni
@A1
= 


w
(1  ) 
ni



G  [(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)]
 1

E
+ [(1 + )f(H1)  f(H0)]
 x
2
0

w
(1  ) 
ni




Therefore, @ni=@A1 < 0 when  2 (0; 1]. 
Appendix 6: Equilibrium with Intermediation
We prove existence in the model of Section 5. First consider xed participation.
Then GM(rd; w) = 0 denes w as a decreasing function of rd in (rd; w) space, with
intercept w0 given by the solution to (10) with
N = niE(i) + nii
Z 1
0
Z 1
i
(e   i)dFe(eji)dFi(i):
As rd ! 1, w converges monotonically to w1 > 0, dened as the solution to (10)
with N = niE(i). As regards the BM(rd; w) curve, rst, rd = 0 when w  w2,
with w2 solving
A
ne(1  ) = ( w2)e
Z 1
0
Z 1
i
[i + (1  )e]dFe(eji)dFi(i):
Second, the BM(rd; w) curve hits rd = r as w ! 0, and it is strictly decreasing for
rd 2 [0; r). These observations ensure an intersection (interior or not), so equilibrium
exists. There are two types of equilibria: (i) rd = 0 and w = w0; and (ii) rd 2 (0; r)
and w 2 ( w1; w0). When equilibrium with rd > 0 exists uniquely, w2 > w0 and the
BM curve crosses the GM curve from above. We conclude that when rd = 0, A
has no e¤ect; and when rd > 0 a rise in A or  lowers rd and increases N and g.
This completes the case without entry. The case with entry is similar.
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Empirical Variable Denitions
Dependent
Technology Transfer: Firm-specic variable. Binary variable equal to one if the rms (self reported)
most important source of technology is any of: new licensing or turnkey opera-
tions from international sources,new licensing or turnkey operations from do-
mestic sources,new licensing or turnkey operations from domestic sources,
obtained from universities or public institutions.[2005:Q61b]
Independent - Explanatory
Private credit/GDP: Country-specic variable. The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks
to GDP, used as a proxy for a countrys level of nancial development. Taken
from Beck et al (1999).
Private credit/GDP: Country-specic variable. The previous term squared.
Independent - Instruments
Legal origin: Country-specic variable. A set of three dummy variables, French-civil,
German-civil, and common law, indicating the origin of a countrys legal sys-
tem. A countrys legal code can have multiple inuences. Taken from Djankov
et al (2007), and the CIA World Factbook.
Independent - Controls
Market size: Country-specic variable. The population of the country in which a rm oper-
ates. Taken from Penn World Tables 6.3.
Price level of investment: Country-specic variable. PPP over investment level, divided by exchange rate
with US$, multiplied by 100. Taken from Penn World Tables 6.3.
Openness: Country-specic variable. Exports plus imports, divided by GDP. Taken from
Penn World Tables 6.3.
Investment level: Country-specic variable. Investment as a share of GDP. Taken from Penn
World Tables 6.4.
Firm size: Firm-specic variable. Number of permanent, full-time employees employed at
a rm, self reported. [2005:Q66a]
Presence of foreign capital: Firm-specic variable. Dummy variable equal to one if a positive percentage of
a rm is owned by foreign individuals or businesses, self reported. [2005:S5b]
Industry dummies: Firm-specic variable. A set of seven dummy variables designating a rms
industry. A rm belongs to a certain industry if the majority of its operations
are in the specied eld. Industries are: mining, construction, manufacturing,
transport, wholesale, real estate, hotel and restaurant services, and other if
none of these are applicable. [2005:Q2a-g; 2002:q2a-g]
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Table 1: Summary of Country Statistics
Technology Transfer Private Credit to GDP
Number of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean
Albania 82 0.024 0.155 0.118
Armenia 182 0.005 0.074 0.069
Azerbaijan 164 0.110 0.314
Belarus 93 0.011 0.104
Bosnia 89 0.011 0.106 0.391
Azerbaijan 83 0.048 0.215 0.378
Croatia 94 0.000 0.000 0.563
Czech Republic 78 0.077 0.268 0.330
Estonia 40 0.048 0.158 0.619
Georgia 56 0.054 0.227 0.113
Germany 277 0.126 0.333 1.109
Greece 206 0.024 0.154 0.715
Hungary 91 0.099 0.300 0.475
Ireland 191 0.037 0.188 1.421
Kazakhstan 182 0.033 0.179 0.276
Korea 94 0.128 0.335 0.894
Kyrgyzstan 86 0.093 0.292 0.072
Latvia 51 0.098 0.300 0.549
Lithunia 57 0.053 0.225 0.328
Macedonia, FYR 63 0.032 0.177 0.226
Moldova 136 0.044 0.206 0.208
Poland 326 0.058 0.235 0.277
Portugal 126 0.016 0.125 1.403
Romania 247 0.045 0.207 0.166
Russia Federation 178 0.039 0.195 0.227
Serbia & Montenegro 110 0.018 0.134 0.229
Slovak Republic 50 0.060 0.240 0.314
Slovenia 65 0.015 0.124 0.530
Spain 185 0.016 0.127 1.301
Tajikistan 70 0.014 0.120
Turkey 162 0.025 0.156 0.184
Ukraine 181 0.028 0.164
Uzbekistan 64 0.016 0.125
Note: Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2005.
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Table 2: Percentage of Firms Engaging in Technology Transfer by Firm Size
Below Mean Private Credit to GDP Above Mean Private Credit to GDP
(%) (%)
Firm Size
(number of employees)
2-10 2.25 4.76
11-50 4.06 5.60
51-100 5.47 6.47
101-250 5.60 2.84
251-500 5.16 4.21
501-1000 10.17 7.50
>1000 4.08 7.32
All Firms 4.16 5.13
Note: Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2005.
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Table 3: OLS Regression of Technology Transfer on Private Credit, Uninstrumented
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Technology Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private credit to GDP 0.0139* 0.0287* 0.0276* 0.1308*** 0.1607*** 0.1649***
(0.0080) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0381) (0.0464) (0.0468)
Private credit to GDP2 -0.0794*** -0.0839*** -0.0870***
(0.0253) (0.0774) (0.0279)
Log market size 0.0191*** 0.0181*** 0.0158*** 0.0148***
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Price level of investment -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Openness 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Investment level -0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Log rm size 0.0061*** 0.0062***
(0.0022) (0.0022)
Presence of 0.0050 0.0049
foreign capital (0.0110) 0.0110)
Industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Intercept 0.0395*** -0.1504*** -0.1730*** 0.0153 -0.1211** -0.1443
(0.0055) (0.0476) (0.0508) (0.0095) (0.0485) (0.0515)
Number of observations 3587 3509 3509 3587 3509 3509
Note: *  Signicant at 10% level, **  Signicant at 5% level, and ***  Signicant at 1%
level. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression of Technology Transfer on Private Credit
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Technology Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private credit to GDP 0.0645*** 0.3366*** 0.3202*** 0.5517*** 0.4168*** 0.4073***
(0.0137) (0.0608) (0.0585) (0.0764) 0.0764) (0.0755)
Private credit to GDP2 -0.3209*** -0.0768* -0.0802*
(0.0495) (0.0448) (0.0447)
Firm size  Private credit to GDP -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log market size 0.0263*** 0.0255*** 0.0223*** 0.0215***
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0048)
Price level of investment -0.0067*** -0.0064*** -0.0059*** -0.0056***
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Openness 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 0.0002
Investment level -0.0044*** -0.0041*** -0.0046*** -0.0043***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Firm size 0.0000** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Presence of foreign capital 0.0138 0.0140
(0.0112) (0.0111)
Industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Intercept 0.0121** 0.0350 0.0085 -0.0932*** 0.0378 0.0121
(0.0081) 0.0612) (0.0622) (0.0182) (0.0605) (0.0616)
Number of observations 3587 3509 3509 3587 3509 3509
Note: Private credit is instrumented by legal origin, *  Signicant at 10% level, **  Signicant
at 5% level, and ***  Signicant at 1% level. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Probit Regression of Technology Transfer on Private Credit
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Technology Transfer
(1) (2) (3)
Private credit to GDP 0.5640*** 0.8845*** 0.8934***
(0.1147) (0.3044) (0.3002)
Firm sizeprivate credit to GDP -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Log market size 0.2618*** 0.2544***
(0.0434) (0.0438)
Price level of investment -0.0208*** -0.0211***
(0.0073) (0.0072)
Openness 0.0090*** 0.0089***
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Firm size 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Industry dummies No No Yes
Intercept -1.9511*** -4.2743*** -4.3427***
(0.0640) (0.5348) (0.5723)
Number of observations 3587 3509 3467
Note: Private credit is instrumented by legal origin, *  Signicant at 10% level, **  Signicant
at 5% level, and ***  Signicant at 1% level. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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